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1. The USPTO was established in 1836. Andrew A. Schwartz, The Patent Office Meets the
Poison Pill: Why Legal Methods Cannot Be Patented, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 333, 341 (2007).
Under the Patent Act, Congress empowers the USPTO to examine patent applications and
determine whether they meet prescribed requirements set forth in the Act. JANICE M. MUELLER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 40 (2d ed. 2006); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 341.
2. A patent represents a property right “to exclude others from making, using, selling,
offering to sell, or importing the patented invention in the United States during the term of the
patent.” MUELLER, supra note 1, at 40. Currently, a patent term expires after roughly twenty years.
Id. at 17. 
3. See Steve Seidenberg, Crisis Pending: Can a Patent on a Legal Strategy Prevent a Client
from Taking Your Advice? The Courts May Soon Decide, 93 A.B.A. J. 42, 42 (May 2007)
(providing a similar hypothetical); see also Andrew A. Schwartz, Patents on Legal Methods? No
Way!, 107 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR, (Feb. 14, 2007), http://www.columbialawreview.org/articles/
patents-on-legal-methods-no-way (“[N]o attorney wants to pause before advising a client in order
to run a patent search to make sure that no one owns the advice she is about to give.”).
4. As this Note mentions, in March 2007, parties settled out of court on a suit alleging an
estate-planning technique infringed on a patent right over a tax strategy. Consent Final Judgment
Regarding Settlement Agreement, Wealth Transfer Group v. Rowe, No. 3:06-CV-00024 (D. Conn.
Mar. 9, 2007), available at http://tax.aicpa.org/NR/rdonlyres/D62E55BF-474B-4E5C-
94A0-AF140F9D5604/0/WTG_ROWE_FINALCONSENTJUDGMENT.pdf. Still, given the rise
in tax strategy patents and reported interest in patenting other legal methods, many believe courts
will grapple with the issue with increasing frequency in the near future. See generally Seidenberg,
supra note 3, at 44 (suggesting courts will soon decide on the patentability of legal methods).
5. See generally Seidenberg, supra note 3, at 44 (calling attention to the rise in tax strategy
patents, a type of legal method). With the Federal Circuit extending patent protection to business
method patents, the USPTO began issuing patents for tax strategies and other legal methods. See
infra notes 92–107 and accompanying text. Oftentimes there is a discrepancy between the
1. Interference with a Client’s Counsel of Choice . . . . . 1172
2. Interference with Independent Professional
Judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174
V. WHO BEARS THE ULTIMATE COSTS? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176
VI. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177
I.  INTRODUCTION
Imagine, before advising each client, having to confer with the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)  to determine whether another1
lawyer already owns a patent  to the legal strategy you wish to propose.2 3
Imagine having to pay someone so your client can follow legal advice you
wish to impart. Worse yet, imagine having to forego the most favorable
legal course of action for your client simply because your client cannot
afford it! While these possibilities may seem outlandish, this is precisely
what courts may soon decide.4
Judicial affirmation of the patentability of legal strategies could
become a stark reality sooner than lawyers think.  In light of our patent5
2
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standards set by courts and those applied by the USPTO. Graham v. Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 18–19
(1966). 
While we have focused attention on the appropriate standard to be applied by the
courts, it must be remembered that the primary responsibility for sifting out
unpatentable material lies in the Patent Office. To await litigation is—for all
practical purposes—to debilitate the patent system. We have observed a notorious
difference between the standards applied by the Patent Office and by the courts.
While many reasons can be adduced to explain the discrepancy, one may well be
the free rein often exercised by Examiners . . . .
Id. at 18. With respect to legal strategies, the same may be surmised. Courts interpret standards set
forth by both the Constitution and Congress, but the USPTO is charged with applying them. See
MUELLER, supra note 1, at 40. Therefore, the USPTO’s interpretation of existing law is vitally
important because it, in effect, determines what receives patent protection. These agency
determinations, however, are subject to congressional and judicial override.
6. See Dana Remus Irwin, Paradise Lost in the Patent Law? Changing Visions of
Technology in the Subject Matter Inquiry, 60 FLA. L. REV. 775, 778 (2008). Critics have repeatedly
argued over the misinterpretation of patent law, asserting present application of patent law allows
for “limitless subject matter.” Id. at 778–79.
7. For example, in the nineteenth century, both courts and the patent office concluded
business method patents did not qualify as patentable subject matter. Id. at 795. But in 1998, the
Federal Circuit granted patent protection to business method patents. State St. Bank & Trust Co.
v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In this decision’s
aftermath, the USPTO began issuing patents to tax strategies, which the USPTO viewed as a form
of business method. Marshall Tracht, Patenting a Business or Legal Strategy, REAL ESTATE
MONITOR, Summer 2007, at 5, 5–6, available at http://www.bdo.com/publications/industry/
real/re_summer07/patenting.asp. The Summer 2007 publication of this newsletter reported fifty-two
tax patents issued by the USPTO and at least eighty-four published pending applications for tax
strategies. Id. As of September 2008, these numbers have climbed, with at least seventy tax patents
issued and 117 published applications for tax strategies pending approval. For tax strategy patents
issued by the USPTO, see http://www.uspto.gov/patft/index.html (choose “Advanced Search”
hyperlink under either “Issued Patents” or “Published Applications”; then insert search term
“ccl/705/36T” in the space provided) (last visited Sept. 21, 2008). As this Note illustrates, the ease
with which unforeseen technological developments receive patent protection is consistent with the
liberal construction of subject matter eligibility. See Irwin, supra note 6, at 807; infra notes 58–61
and accompanying text.
Writing for the majority in In re Bergy, Judge Rich explained that for ‘nearly 200
years . . . [the Patent Act has] been liberally construed to include the most diverse
range imaginable of unforeseen developments in technology . . . . We believe
§ 101 and its predecessor statutes were broadly drawn in general terms to broadly
encompass unforeseeable future developments . . . .’
Irwin, supra note 6, at 806 n.202 (quoting In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 973–74 (C.C.P.A. 1979),
system’s history, this prospect should come as no surprise. Both federal
courts and the USPTO have continually pushed the envelope of patentable
subject matter.  With increasing vigor, the USPTO issues patents in6
previously unpatentable areas.  7
3
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vacated in part by Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (C.C.P.A.), aff’d, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)
(alteration in original)). 
8. See Seidenberg, supra note 3, at 44; Floyd Norris, Patent Law is Getting Tax Crazy, INT’L
HERALD TRIB., Oct. 19, 2006, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/10/19/business/
norris20.php; Tracht, supra note 7, at 6. Describing GRATs, Seidenberg explains: 
When a GRAT is set up, the donor funds it with assets that are expected to grow
in value. The donor receives a fixed annuity from the GRAT during the life of the
trust. When the GRAT expires, the corpus is distributed to the trust’s
beneficiaries—and the amount of gift tax is based on the discounted future value
of the assets at the time they were placed into the GRAT, not the (larger) actual
value of the assets at the time they are distributed to the trust’s beneficiaries.What
Slane claims to have invented—and what his patent covers—is the use of
unqualified stock options to partially or fully fund a GRAT. 
Seidenberg, supra note 3, at 44.
9. See Tracht, supra note 7, at 6. 
10. Slane’s suit named neither Rowe’s estate planning attorney nor Rowe’s other financial
advisors as defendants. Seidenberg, supra note 3, at 44.
11. See id.; Tracht, supra note 7, at 6.
12. Helen Gunnarsson, Can Lawyers Patent Their Legal Techniques? A Patent Issued on an
Estate-Planning Technique Has That Bar Buzzing, 95 ILL. B.J. 344, 344 (2007) (discussing Wealth
Transfer Group v. Rowe, No. 3:06-CV-00024 (D. Conn. Mar. 9, 2007)). Pursuant to a confidential
settlement, the court dismissed the suit. Id. 
13. See Tracht, supra note 7, at 6.
14. See Seidenberg, supra note 3, at 44; supra text accompanying note 7. 
15. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 346–47.
16. Reacting to the idea that estate-planning strategies may soon be subject to patent
protection, Chicago attorney Christine Albright, chair to the American Bar Association’s Section
of Real Property, Probate, and Trust Law, commented: “‘[T]here’s no area of legal practice that
couldn’t have patents issued.’” Gunnarsson, supra note 12, at 344; see also 1 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S
WALKER ON PATENTS § 5:2 (4th ed. 2007) (explaining that questions have been raised as to whether
new technological fields should be included under the patent system, and stating “the law continues
Take Robert Slane, a financial adviser in Florida, for instance. In 2003,
Slane received the first tax strategy patent, which covers the use of
unqualified stock options in grantor-retained annuity trusts, or GRATs.8
Just three years later, Slane succeeded in filing the first suit alleging
infringement of a patented tax strategy.  Slane sued former chairman and9
CEO of Aetna Insurance, John Rowe,  alleging Rowe, as part of an estate10
plan, funded several GRATs covered by Slane’s patent.  While the parties11
settled in March 2007,  courts will likely render legal rulings on the12
patentability of other legal methods in the future. This possibility seems
particularly likely as professionals like Slane pursue similar measures to
protect their patent rights,  and as the number of patents issued for various13
methods increases.  14
Since the USPTO began issuing tax strategy patents in 2003,  many15
insist patentability for other legal methods is inevitable.  To be sure, this16
4
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to exhibit movement even in connection with particular fields of long standing. Recent actions by
the United States Patent and Trademark Office, as well as court decisions, have for example led to
an increased recognition that patent rights can be obtained that effectively dominate methods of
doing business . . . .”). But see Schwartz, supra note 3 (dismissing the patentability of legal
methods).
17. This is true, in part, because courts recognize legislative history supporting broad
construction over statutory subject matter. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,
308–09 (1980) (suggesting that the purposeful inclusion of expansive terms in the Patent Act’s
statutory language indicate that “Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given
wide scope”).
18. Seidenberg, supra note 3, at 44, 47.
19. Id. at 47. Some concerns found across-the-board include the notion that patent protection
constitutes bad public policy, stifles innovation, and ultimately reduces incentive to find better
alternatives. Id. With respect to patents on legal methods in particular, an overarching concern is
that patent protection will undermine a lawyer’s professional independence to advise clients fully.
See infra Part IV.C.2. Lawyers may hesitate suggesting the best advice to a client if acting upon
that advice borders on infringement of one or more patents. See id.
20. In response to a patent issued on an estate-planning technique, Helen Gunnarsson
suggests patenting legal strategies is similar to patenting other methods: “[t]o a patent lawyer’s way
of thinking . . . patenting a method of jury selection or other litigation strategy—is not only not
astounding[,] but isn’t any different from patenting a method used in any business other than law.”
Gunnarsson, supra note 12, at 344.
21. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981). “The patentability of computer
software marked a milestone in the expansion of patentable subject matter, and has been followed
by the patentability of business methods, tax methods, and legal methods.” Irwin, supra note 6, at
813 (footnotes omitted).
22. See Seidenberg, supra note 3, at 47.
23. See Daniel Robinson, The Pros and Cons of Patents, IT WEEK, July 30, 2007, at 14, 14,
available at http://www.itweek.co.uk/itweek/comment/2195198/pros-cons-patents (arguing that the
U.S. patent system spurs dubious patents and grants protective rights to trivial patents, which only
stifles innovation and adds unnecessary costs to the industry and, ultimately, to consumers). But
see Paul Heckel, Debunking the Software Patent Myths, 35 COMM. ACM 121, 122–23 (1992),
available at http://delivery.acm.org/10.1145/130000/129897/p121-heckel.pdf?key1=129897&key2
=6866731221&coll=ACM&dl=ACM&CFID=2723716&CFTOKEN=67499680 (suggesting that
academic articles read by the computer community inaccurately portray an anti-software patent bias
and that patent rights, particularly for individual inventors, are “crucially important”). See generally
notion will be contested. History reveals that with virtually every
technological development, professionals grapple with patentability.
Despite concerns about extending patent protection, history foretells that
the case for patentability will likely prevail.  Whatever qualms critics17
express about patentability, professionals learn to operate within the
parameters of patent protection.  Because industries in the past have18
adapted to patent protection, many patent experts discount concerns within
the legal profession.  Since other professions have adapted to patent19
protection, the argument goes, lawyers should adapt to patent protection
as well.20
Indeed, not long after courts affirmed software patentability,  the21
industry learned to adjust —albeit not without a fight.  Similar reactions22 23
5
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Gordon Irlam and Ross Williams, Software Patents: An Industry at Risk (League for Programming
Freedom, 1994), http://progfree.org/Patents/industry-at-risk.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2008)
(arguing software is an inappropriate subject for the issuance and enforcement of patents).
24. In 1982, Congress created a new appellate court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: About the Court,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/about.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2008). Congress granted the Federal
Circuit exclusive nationwide jurisdiction over appeals in cases where the complaint states a cause
of action arising under patent laws. MUELLER, supra note 1, at 35. “As a practical matter, the
creation of the Federal Circuit has resulted in a single, relatively coherent body of patent case law
on which district courts and litigants can rely with greater certainty than the disparate decisions
reached by the regional circuits in patent cases prior to 1982.” Id. at 36. On rare occasion, the U.S.
Supreme Court reviews decisions rendered by the Federal Circuit on patent matters. Id. at 32. On
these occasions, the resulting Supreme Court decisions bind the Federal Circuit. Id.
25. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 1998). Since announcing this decision, “the USPTO has received a flood of business method
patent applications.” MUELLER, supra note 1, at 222.
26. See Seidenberg, supra note 3, at 44.
27. Tracht, supra note 7, at 5 (“Following the State Street decision, the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) created a new classification for patents: ‘Data processing: financial,
business practice, management or cost/price determination.’”). 
28. See supra note 7.
29. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 346.
30. See, e.g., Method for Providing Property Rights Based Guarantees, U.S. Patent No.
7,158,949 (filed Dec. 17, 2004) (issued Jan. 2, 2007). 




occurred in 1998 when the Federal Circuit  extended patent protection to24
business methods.  Tax strategies, today’s latest rave in the patent arena,25 26
have also entered the realm of patentability with ease, with the USPTO
establishing a patent classification almost exclusively for tax strategies27
and issuing a number of patents as a result.  Since tax strategies are not28
significantly distinct from other kinds of legal methods, the USPTO could
theoretically grant patents for legal methods in other areas.  In fact, the29
USPTO already has.30
With patentability efforts penetrating most professions, one might
question whether patent protection will tamper with one of the underlying
traits that propels our legal system—creativity.  Creativity lies at the crux31
of any successful career.  Successful lawyering is often rooted in the32
ability to innovatively combat complex societal problems while
simultaneously serving a client’s interests.  This dual responsibility33
coupled with the unique nature of the lawyer-client relationship sets the
legal profession apart from many others. Whether relying on personal
creativity or “following the paths others have blazed,”  creativity, used as34
a tool in the legal profession, can prove life-altering—both for the client
6
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35. One might argue “life-altering” is an extreme description. However, consider the stakes.
Some clients risk it all—finances, reputation, time, and energy—to resolve a dispute favorably, and
the outcome rests heavily on the lawyer’s ability to combat the issue innovatively. An unfavorable
outcome surely affects a client’s life. Likewise, a lawyer invests time, energy, and professional
reputation to resolve a matter on the client’s behalf. A faux pas on the lawyer’s part could be
catastrophic personally and professionally.
36. This appears particularly true in light of the alarming number of trivial patents granted
annually. As one author argues, “trivial patents not only stifle innovation, they add to the cost of
products and services.” Robinson, supra note 23, at 14. 
and the lawyer.  As this Note will demonstrate, imposing legal restrictions35
on creativity has the potential not only to frustrate good lawyering efforts
but also to impinge on overriding societal interests.36
With rumors buzzing throughout the legal community on reported
patent filings for legal strategies, many wonder: Will courts extend patent
protection to innovative legal methods? Would such court findings
undermine societal interests? More specifically, given an attorney’s
professional obligations toward clients, would patent protection contravene
societal interests and unnecessarily hamper a client’s best interests? 
It is beyond the scope of this Note to enumerate all the problems
associated with patenting legal methods and strategies. Rather, this Note
aims to engage in a normative analysis to determine whether patenting
legal strategies should occur in light of a lawyer’s professional duties
toward a client. The primary objectives of this discussion are to raise
awareness within the legal community and cast light on a number of
concerns that all lawyers should consider. With so much at stake, it is
incumbent that all lawyers examine the repercussions stemming from
patenting legal strategies.
This Note argues patent protection should not extend to legal methods
because of the professional responsibilities lawyers owe to the profession
and to clients. Part II explains why legal methods merit discussion today.
To appreciate the effects legal method patents could have on the legal
profession, Part II then presents an overview of pertinent patent law and
explains how legal methods are likely eligible for patent protection. Part
III raises the question whether legal methods should receive patent
protection in light of social and economic considerations. Part IV
addresses implications for a lawyer’s professional obligations if courts
extend patent protection over legal methods. And Part V considers who
bears the ultimate costs from legal method patents.
7
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37. See Seidenberg, supra note 3, at 44. The decision rendered in State Street “created a new
awareness that business method claims could be patented. Patent applications in that area went from
1,500 filings in Fiscal Year 1998 to approximately 9,000 filings in Fiscal Year 2001.” Hearing on
Issues Relating to the Patenting of Tax Advice Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures
of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. 5 (2006) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of
James Toupin, General Counsel, USPTO), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/
hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=5271.
38. See supra text accompanying note 7 (explaining how one can retrieve published
applications online). For lists and examples of tax patents and published applications, see the ABA
Section of Taxation Task Force on Patenting of Tax Strategies, http://www.abanet.org/tax/patents/
home.html (last visited on Sept. 22, 2008).
39. See, e.g., Method for Providing Property Rights Based Guarantees, supra note 30.
40. Seidenberg, supra note 3, at 44. 
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 349.
44. Id.
45. See discussion infra Part II.B (describing the statutory requirements).
II.  THE CASE FOR LEGAL STRATEGY PATENTS
A.  Why Legal Method Patents Are Cause for Concern
Attorneys throughout the country are discovering patents increasingly
being issued for tax strategies.  The USPTO has already granted at least37
seventy patents covering specific tax strategies. An additional 117
published applications for tax strategy patents currently await approval.38
What’s more, the USPTO has begun issuing patents for other legal
methods such as property right guarantees.  Legal strategy patents are39
rumored to be pending in other areas of the law, such as corporate law, real
estate and estate planning.  At least one patent holder filed an40
infringement lawsuit over a tax strategy device used as part of an estate-
planning technique.   Additionally, at least one company boasts on-line41
about its pending patent application on servitudes.  42
The USPTO has opened a Pandora’s box by endorsing the patentability
of tax strategies.  As one author asserts:43
Under the [USPTO’s] interpretation of the Patent Act, there
appears to be no distinction between a tax strategy and
another type of legal strategy that would exclude other legal
strategies from patentability. So long as it is new, and ‘works’
under the law as it currently stands, the [USPTO] appears to
be of the view that any legal method would be patentable.44
Moreover, in determining whether to extend protection over a patent item,
the USPTO looks only to the requirements of the Patent Act,  and does45
8
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46. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 357–58.
47. ABA Section of Taxation Task Force on Patenting of Tax Strategies, Task Force on
Patenting of Tax Strategies, http://www.abanet.org/tax/patents/home.html#examples (last visited
Sept. 22, 2008).
48. Seidenberg, supra note 3, at 42, 45. After discovering patents issued on certain strategies
for minimizing taxes in estate planning, Dennis Belcher, a trust and estate attorney in Virginia,
realized the severity of the matter and now “follow[s] the topic for professional protection and to
keep [his] clients out of a patent lawsuit.” Id. at 42. “Belcher says he is changing his morning
routine to minimize that [patent infringement] risk. ‘Every morning, I’ve always read tax notes
from the IRS . . . . Now I should also be looking at the patent office classification for tax strategy
patents.’” Id. at 45. “It now becomes important for many businesses that never considered
themselves ‘researchers and developers’ to be sure they have practices and procedures in place to
ensure the fruits of their intellectual labors are protected.” Tracht, supra note 7, at 6. Arguably,
technological advances make it easier to track issued patents. Westlaw, for example, allows users
to receive e-mail updates in the patent arena by setting up a WestClip from the Alert Center.
49. See Seidenberg, supra note 3, at 45.
50. Id. at 47; see also Hearing, supra note 37, at 56-57; MOY, supra note 16, at § 5:2 (stating
that under the Constitution, “the patent system can apply to a broad range of the statutory subject
matters”). But see Schwartz, supra note 1, at 335–36 (criticizing the USPTO for acting beyond the
scope of its power in issuing legal method patents and arguing legal methods, though useful
innovations, should not be patentable as they do not constitute “inventions” under the Patent Act);
Schwartz, supra note 3 (“[I]t pays to stop and consider whether such [legal method] patents are
valid at all. As 150 years of consistent Supreme Court precedent make plain, they are
not . . . . [O]nly ‘inventions’ may be patented[,] . . . [and] legal methods are not inventions in this
sense.”).
51. MUELLER, supra note 1, at 5.
52. See id. at 14; Schwartz, supra note 1, at 336; see also MOY, supra note 16, at § 1:1 (A
not consider other positive law when granting patent rights.  Because the46
USPTO does not preoccupy itself with other positive law when granting
patents, it seems likely that the USPTO will continue to grant patent rights
to other legal methods, in an almost mechanical fashion, so long as the
method conforms with pre-existing requirements of the Patent Act.
These developments implicate all areas of legal practice,  and lawyers47
are taking notice. The surge in tax strategy patents has unleashed enough
concern—whether legitimate or not—for some attorneys to pursue
precautionary measures to avoid patent infringement.  With uncertainty48
looming in respective legal areas, the duty to keep abreast of newly issued
patents may soon separate lawyers who wage litigation on behalf of clients
from those lawyers against whom litigation will be waged.  49
B.  An Overview of the Elements of Patent Law
Patent experts generally agree that patenting legal methods falls within
the province of patent law.  A patent affords legal protection for50
intellectual property;  it represents a government-issued property right51
conferred on an inventor that serves to exclude others from creating, using,
selling, or importing the patented invention for a term of years.  Patent52
9
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patent “refers to a legal right given by the sovereign government to control the utilization of an
invention.”). This property right is considered a negative right. MUELLER, supra note 1, at 14.
Patents do not convey any affirmative rights to make, use, sell, or import an invention. Id. As a
result, a patent holder might own a patent and yet be precluded from practicing the patented
invention due to other governing laws and regulations. Id.
53. MUELLER, supra note 1, at 29.
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This constitutional provision is known as the Intellectual
Property Clause. MUELLER, supra note 1, at 29. The IP Clause really grants two congressional
powers—the copyright power, which is derived from the word “Science,” and the patent power,
which is derived from the phrase “useful Arts.” Id. at 29–30. This phrase is understood as referring
to patentable subject matter, because historically “Arts” was construed to mean technologies and
industries. Id. Despite this grant of wide congressional power, the Court has recognized a limitation
on congressional authority to execute the “constitutional goal of ‘promot[ing] the progress of
Science and Useful Arts.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). For
instance, Congress is constitutionally prohibited from establishing a patent system where patents
can be acquired for technology already existing in the public domain, or that is a mere obvious
extension of an existing technology. Id. 
55. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980).
56. Id. (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974)). One author
explains the conventional economic theory underlying the rationale of our country’s patent system
this way:
[W]ithout government intervention, a society will produce too little
technological innovation, which is a suboptimal result. The animating concern of
the patent system is that, once an inventor reveals her invention to the world,
others may copy and sell it . . . .
[A]t least some people who might have otherwise spent time and money
conceiving and developing new inventions will not do so, thus depriving society
of valuable inventions . . . .
A patent system, whereby inventors are granted a monopoly over their
inventions for a term of years, counters these tendencies. During the period of
exclusivity, the inventor has monopoly pricing power over her invention, which
should allow her to recoup her research and development (“R&D”) costs, and then
turn a profit. This right provides an incentive to invent and encourages
technological progress.
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 338 (footnote omitted).
law derives its validity from three primary sources: the U.S. Constitution,
federal statutes and regulations, and case law.  The Constitution provides53
Congress broad authority to “promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”  Patent laws promote54
this progress by providing inventors “exclusive rights for a limited period
as an incentive for their inventiveness.”  Congress exerts this authority “in55
the hope that ‘[t]he productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive
effect on society . . . [and make for] better lives for our citizens.’”56
10
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57. Statutory provisions governing patentability are found in Title 35, U.S.C. MUELLER,
supra note 1, at 31. These provisions directly affect the USPTO’s operation. Id. To implement these
statutory provisions, the USPTO issues regulations, which are set forth in Title 37 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR). Id.
58. See generally MUELLER, supra note 1 (examining the particularities of modern patent law
with significant regard to the impact recent judicial interpretation of the statutory requirements has
had on the patent law field).  Gunnarsson describes, “[i]n simplified terms, the item must be new
and useful, not obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the area covered by the invention, and
fully described in the patent application.” Gunnarsson, supra note 12, at 344.
59. For discussion on the development and evolution of the subject-matter inquiry, see
generally Irwin, supra note 6.
60. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). Since the Patent Act of 1793, the statutory definition of
patentable subject matter has remained largely unaltered. Irwin, supra note 6, at 777 n.11. The sole
change came about in the Patent Act of 1952, when Congress, only intending to merely clarify and
not alter the meaning of the provision, replaced “process” with “art.” Id. Since the Patent Act of
1793, the requirements of novelty and utility had been the only statutory requirements; while the
Patent Act was revised and amended “some 50 times between 1790 and 1950, Congress steered
clear of a statutory set of requirements other than the bare novelty and utility tests.” Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 10 (1966). Congress expressly added a third statutory requirement, the
obviousness test, in the Patent Act of 1952. Id. at 3.
61. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307–08 (1980); see Irwin, supra note 6, at 777
(stating both Congress and the Supreme Court have interpreted § 101 broadly).
62. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
63. Id. at 315.
64. Id. at 309; see Irwin, supra note 6, at 778.
Pursuant to its constitutional authority, Congress has enacted (and
revised) federal patent statutes.  The current U.S. Patent Act specifies four57
basic statutory requirements for a patent: (1) eligible subject matter and
utility; (2) novelty; (3) nonobviousness to a person having ordinary skill
in the art at the time the invention was created; and (4) sufficient
disclosure in the text of the patent application to demonstrate the inventor
possessed the claimed invention upon filing, and the skilled practitioner is
able to make and use the claimed invention without undue
experimentation.  58
Section 101 of the U.S. Patent Act, which establishes patentable subject
matter,  reads: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful59
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.”  Prior case law supports broad60
construction for this provision.  In Diamond v. Chakrabarty,  the U.S.61 62
Supreme Court opined that “[t]he subject-matter provisions of the patent
law have been cast in broad terms to fulfill the constitutional and statutory
goal of promoting ‘the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.’”63
While legislative history suggests Congress intended that patent laws
be granted wide scope, § 101 is not without limits.  The Court has held64
“laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not
11
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65. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309; see Irwin, supra note 6, at 778.
66. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187–88 (1981). “[I]deas that are not merely
abstract but do contain practical applications may indeed be patentable.” Gunnarsson, supra note
12, at 344.
67. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
68. Id. (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309); Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182.
As James Toupin, General Counsel of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
noted in his testimony before the House Committee on Ways and Means on July
13, 2006[,] . . . the court [sic] has also acknowledged that Congress intended
‘anything under the sun that is made by man’ to be patentable under 35 USC
section 101.
Gunnarsson, supra note 12, at 344.
69. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980).
70. Id. at 316. “[T]he courts have interpreted the broad language of the Patent Act that the
Act is designed to provide innovative stimulus equally across the board and to all forms of
innovation that meet the broad language of the statute.” Hearing, supra note 37, at 15. 
71. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
72. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). For an interesting discussion on this requirement’s conception,
evolution, and eventual codification, see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 3–17 (1966). One
author suggests Thomas Jefferson made the earliest reference to the nonobviousness element in a
patent bill he drafted shortly after the Act of 1790. See E.C. Walterscheid, Thomas Jefferson and
the Patent Act of 1793, 40 ESSAYS IN HIST. (1998), http://etext.virginia.edu/journals/EH/EH40/
walter40.html. While case law recognized the nonobviousness requirement as early as 1851 in
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850), Congress did not codify this condition
until the Patent Act of 1952. Graham, 383 U.S. at 3–4, 11, 15 (citing Hotchkiss, which “posit[ed]
the condition that a patentable invention evidence more ingenuity and skill than that possessed by
an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business”). The Hotchkiss test encapsulated the views
suggested by Thomas Jefferson, whom some attribute to be the first administrator of the patent
patentable.  Yet, even with these judicially recognized limits in65
patentability, the Court has carved out exceptions. Namely, the Court has
held that nonstatutory subject matter may be afforded patent protection
where there is an application of an abstract idea or law of nature.  Indeed,66
the Court has acknowledged that “[t]he repetitive use of the expansive
term ‘any’ in § 101”  indicates that Congress intended the provision to67
include “‘anything under the sun that is made by man.’”  Additionally, the68
Court has never articulated a principle “that inventions in areas not
contemplated by Congress when the patent laws were enacted are
unpatentable per se.”  Rather, the Court has interpreted Congress’ broad69
language in § 101 to protect unforeseeable inventions, recognizing that
unanticipated inventions frequently come to fruition.  70
Once a court determines that an invention satisfies the eligible subject
matter test of § 101 of the Patent Act, the court must then scrutinize
whether the invention meets the Act’s other three requirements. Section
102 of the Act sets forth the statutory novelty necessary for patentability;71
§ 103 sets forth the criteria for nonobviousness;  and, § 112 provides the72
12
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system. Id. at 7, 11. Among other things, Jefferson believed patent protection should not extend to
“obvious improvements.” Id. at 9. 
73. 35 U.S.C § 112 (2006). Pursuant to prescribed statutory requirements, legal method
patents would undergo similar scrutiny. To be sure, to qualify for patent protection, legal methods
must not only pass constitutional muster, but must also meet the statutory conditions of
patentability. It is beyond the scope of this Note to address whether legal method patents generally
meet each of the statutory criteria. It would almost be a moot point. Of greater significance is the
interpretation of the agency charged with granting patent rights. The USPTO applies its own
interpretation of governing patent law. Unequivocally, the USPTO believes legal methods meet
statutory conditions, as it has granted patent protection over various legal methods without much
hesitation.
74. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). The obviousness tests examines whether 
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was
made.
Id. The Court in Graham 
concluded that the 1952 Act was intended to codify judicial precedents embracing
the principle long ago announced by this Court . . . , and that, while the clear
language of § 103 places emphasis on an inquiry into obviousness, the general
level of innovation necessary to sustain patentability remains the same.
Graham, 383 U.S. at 3–4 (citation omitted). In addition to novelty and utility, “the ‘non-obvious’
nature of the ‘subject matter sought to be patented’ to a person having ordinary skill in the pertinent
art” served as a third prerequisite to patentability. Id. at 14. In setting out a framework for applying
§ 103, the Graham Court provided an objective analysis:
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined;
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and
the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background the
obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such
secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs,
failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances
surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented. 
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1734 (2007) (quoting Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18).
“If a court, or patent examiner, conducts this analysis and concludes the claimed subject matter was
obvious, the claim is invalid under § 103.” Id. In cases that followed, the Court has held “[i]f a
person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation [or improvement], § 103 likely bars
its patentability.” Id. at 1740. In KSR International Co., the Court examined “the requirement of
demonstrating a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine known elements in order to show
disclosure requirements for a U.S. patent application.  To be sure, legal73
method patent applications face a formidable challenge to overcome the
non-obvious prerequisite to patentability, a test that examines whether the
eligible subject matter is obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art.74
13
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that the combination is obvious” established by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, and held
“[t]he obviousness analysis cannot be confined by [such] a formalistic conception[,]” and a court
errs in judgment when it “transforms [this] general principle into a rigid rule that limits the
obviousness inquiry.” Id. at 1741.
75. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981); see MUELLER, supra note 1, at 216; Irwin,
supra note 6, at 806.
76. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191.
77. One author suggests this liberal construction of patentable subject matter has provided
an astounding number of inventions to receive patent protection over the years. Schwartz, supra
note 1, at 351.
78. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
79. See supra note 60. Since the original Patent Act set forth in 1790, statutory language has
undergone some change. See MOY, supra note 16, at § 5:2; supra note 60. The original language
granted the power to issue patents for “any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or
any improvement therein.” Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110. The Patent Act of 1793
added the novelty requirement so that the invention be “new and useful.” Patent Act of 1793, ch.
11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 319. The Act of 1836, which carried through to the Act of 1870, revised the
phrasing to read “any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” Patent
Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 119. The current language, which reads “any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,” has remained the same since 1952. 35
U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
80. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182.
81. 35 U.S.C. §100(b) (2006).
82. MUELLER, supra note 1, at 216. 
83. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252 (1853).
An ultimate rejection of patent protection based on these three statutory
provisions, however, does not preclude an initial determination of the
eligibility of the claimed subject matter under § 101.  Accordingly, a75
court must first determine whether legal strategies fall within the § 101
categories of possibly patentable subject matter—namely, process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter—before subjecting a
patent claim to further statutory scrutiny.76
C.  Do Legal Methods Qualify as Eligible Subject Matter?
There is little, if any, doubt that legal methods qualify as patentable
subject matter, especially in light of the Court’s liberal interpretation of
eligible subject matter under § 1 of the Patent Act.  This Section provides77
a skeletal framework of the underlying theories in support of this notion.
Section 101 delineates four categories of patentable subject matter:
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.  The term78
“process,” which was not added to § 101 until 1952,  has undergone79
substantial litigation as processes have “historically enjoyed patent
protection.”  Section 100 provides that “[t]he term ‘process’ means80
process, art or method.”  A method, therefore, is synonymous with a81
process.  In Corning v. Burden,  the Court explained: 82 83
14
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84. Id. at 267–68.
85. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 183.
86. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 342 (footnote omitted). A method is a “series of steps for
accomplishing some result.” MUELLER, supra note 1, at 216. 
87. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188.
88. MUELLER, supra note 1, at 216.
89. See supra note 7.
90. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (quoting United States v. Dubilier
Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199 (1933)).
91. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 342 (footnote omitted). 
[i]t is for the discovery or invention of some practicable
method or means of producing a beneficial result or effect,
that a patent is granted, and not for the result or effect itself.
It is when the term process is used to represent the means or
method of producing a result that it is patentable, and it will
include all methods or means which are not effected by
mechanism or mechanical combinations.  84
Some years later, the Court added: “[a] process is a mode of treatment of
certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of
acts . . . to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing. If new
and useful, it is just as patentable. . . .”  Rather than viewed as a structural85
entity, a process is “‘an operation or series of steps leading to a useful
result,’ and is ‘patentable in and of itself,’ independent of any machinery
or equipment associated with it.”  86
In 1981 the Court provided process claims must be considered as a
whole “because a new combination of steps in a process may be patentable
even though all the constituents of the combination were well known and
in common use before the combination was made.”  As one author87
asserts, “[T]he end product of the process . . . need not itself be patentable;
in other words, a process claim can be granted for a novel and nonobvious
method of making an old product.”  Under this broad interpretion, the88
Court has consistently extended patent protection to subject matter
previously considered unpatentable,  cautioning other courts not to “‘read89
into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has
not expressed.’”  It comes as no surprise then that “novel90
methods . . . have long been held to be patentable. Method patents can be
quite valuable because such a patent covers the method itself, rather than
any specific machines or end products, and therefore sweeps broadly.”91
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92. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
93. Id. at 1375. No congressional law explicitly authorizes tax patents. See Norris, supra
note 8. 
94. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 342–43. 
95. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375.
The original State Street Bank decision, which led to this growth [in tax strategy
patents], was about a means of tracking transactions to maximize the
accountability of capital gains so that those could be captured and used. It was a
hub and spoke method for accomplishing that purpose. The Federal Circuit Court
held that that kind of a method, which optimized the ability to use—among other
things a tax advantage, was useful subject matter that could be patented.
Hearing, supra note 37, at 23.
96. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375 (footnote omitted).
97. Id. (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
98. See, e.g., Seidenberg, supra note 3, at 46–47. Despite widespread criticism stemming
from State Street, this decision remains good law, as the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 343. 
99. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303, 308 (1980)).
100. This is consistent with the Court’s understanding of processes in Corning v. Burden, 56
U.S. (15 How.) 252, 268 (1853), which was re-affirmed in Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182. 
D.  Paving the Way for Legal Methods: Patent Protection
Extended Even Further
Against this backdrop, the Federal Circuit in State Street Bank and
Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group  contemplated whether business92
methods could receive patent protection.  State Street held a “method of93
doing business” fell within the statutory meaning of “process.”  As a94
result, the Federal Circuit concluded that business methods should be
subject to the same requirements for patentability as any other method or
process.  The Federal Circuit provided: “[t]he question of whether a claim95
encompasses statutory subject matter should not focus on which of the four
categories of subject matter a claim is directed to—process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter—but rather on the essential
characteristics of the subject matter, in particular, its practical utility.”96
Stressing the significance of practical utility, the court held that any
new, nonobvious process or method may be patented as long as the subject
matter “produces a ‘useful, concrete, and tangible result.’”  Many patent97
law experts agree that the broader construction of eligible subject matter
held in State Street should also be applicable to legal strategies98
(particularly in light of the Court’s repeated warnings that judges not read
into patent laws limitations that Congress has not expressed),  because99
legal strategies, when combined and considered as a whole, are a means
of producing a beneficial result  and yield useful, concrete and tangible100
16
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101. This is consistent with the Federal Circuit’s construction of the term “process” in State
Street. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373 (citing In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
102. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 343. Whether many of the claimed business methods meet
other statutory requirements including novelty and nonobviousness remains to be seen. But, the §
101 requirement for business methods appears settled. See MUELLER, supra note 1, at 222. 
103. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 343; see also Method for Providing Property Rights Based
Guarantees, U.S. Patent, supra note 30.
104. “Patent experts generally discount the worries of tax attorneys and trust and estate
attorneys because they’ve heard similar concerns expressed before.” Seidenberg, supra note 3,
at 47. 
105. See id.; supra notes 17–20. One author reports: 
Twenty-five years or so ago, when patents were first issued on living matter that
was used to eat oil slicks, there was concern about whether living organisms
should be patented . . . . When software patents [sic] first issued, there was
concern about whether software should be patentable. The same thing happened
for business method patents . . . . Every time there’s a technological development,
people say, ‘Not in my backyard.’ That’s very understandable. It takes a while for
folks to get their heads around what the patent system does and why it should be
applied uniformly across all fields of technological endeavor.
Seidenberg, supra note 3, at 47 (quoting Pamela B. Krupka, chair-elect of the ABA Section of
Intellectual Property Law) (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. Seidenberg, supra note 3, at 47.
107. Id.
108. Id.; cf. Hearing, supra note 37, at 17 (expressing that with concern to tax strategy patents,
“people have been trying to lower their taxes for a long time, and I think there is plenty of activity
here, so I would question this balance as to incentives and protections in this instance”).
results.  Indeed, the USPTO has already extended the State Street101
doctrine in 2003 when it began granting patents for legal strategies,
characterizing them as a certain kind of business method.  Although the102
predominant legal methods that have received patent protection from the
USPTO are tax strategies and structures, it seems only a matter of time
before the USPTO regularly issues patents for other legal methods.103
Patent experts generally disregard whatever fears lawyers share over
this possibility, casting concerns aside as speculative at best.  After all,104
history illustrates the ease with which varied professions have adapted in
response to patentability of inventions.  Legal strategy proponents105
counter that many professionals, including engineers and physicians,
operate in fields where patents impose some restrictions on their work
productivity.  “Under this view, there isn’t any real difference between106
a doctor whose access to certain medical devices is limited by patents and
a lawyer who might need a license to employ certain . . . strategies on
behalf of clients.”  Additionally, patent proponents purport that patent107
protection provides incentive for innovation, prompting practitioners to
develop innovative responses to increasingly complex societal issues.108
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109. In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 297 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., dissenting). 
110. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5
(1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399).
111. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
112. Id. The Court explained, “[t]his qualified authority . . . was written against the backdrop
of the practices—eventually curtailed by the Statute of Monopolies—of the Crown in granting
monopolies to court favorites in goods or businesses which had long before been enjoyed by the
public.” Id.
113. Id. at 5–6.
114. See generally Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the ability to patent should be narrowly construed according to Congress’
Courts and commentators generally reflect the sentiment espoused by
many patent advocates—namely, that this country continually benefits
from emerging technologies and professional developments adapting to
our patent laws.  Yet, while the legal profession may face little difficulty109
in adapting to patentability, and while lawyers may even find themselves
revitalized to serve clients with greater creativity within the confines of
patent law, there is some question whether patenting legal strategies
undermines important societal interests.
III.  GENERAL SOCIETAL CONCERNS
While courts have generally found statutory subject matter to “include
anything under the sun that is made by man,”  it at least appears110
questionable whether Congress, under the auspices of its authority
established under Article I, § 8, of the Constitution, intended to exert
patent protection over legal strategies. 
A.  The Monopoly Effect
As the Graham Court explained, “[I]t must be remembered that the
federal patent power stems from a specific constitutional provision which
authorizes the Congress ‘To promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to
their . . . Discoveries.’”  Importantly, this provision both grants and111
limits power.  The Graham Court cautioned that Congress in exercising112
its patent power must respect this constitutional purpose, and may neither
overreach the constitutional restraints imposed “[n]or . . . enlarge the
patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement or social
benefit gained thereby.  Moreover, Congress may not authorize the
issuance of patents whose effects are to . . . restrict free access to materials
already available.”113
It is difficult to fathom Congress ever intended legal professionals to
secure a monopoly over legal strategies.  Patent protection over legal114
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intent to allow a monopoly).
115. See Seidenberg, supra note 3, at 46.
116. Richard A. Posner, Transaction Costs and Antitrust Concerns in the Licensing of
Intellectual Property, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 325, 329 (2005),
http://www.jmripl.com/Publications/Vol4/Issue3/posner.pdf.
117. MUELLER, supra note 1, at 21.
118. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 319 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Antipathy toward monopolies is
nothing new, and can be traced back to the American Revolution. See Graham v. John Deere Co.,
383 U.S. 1, 7 (1966). As the Graham Court explained, the constitutional provision that empowers
Congress “‘[t]o promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts’ . . . was written against the backdrop of
the practices—eventually curtailed by the Statute of Monopolies—of the Crown in granting
monopolies to court favorites . . . .” Id. at 5. Jefferson, an influential contributor to the development
of our nation’s patent system, shared “an instinctive aversion to monopolies,” with many
Americans at the time. Id. at 7. While Jefferson’s disdain for monopolies initially extended to
patents, he shortly recognized the patent system’s social and economic rationales. Id. at 8–9. Still,
he believed patent rights contravened the “inherent free nature of disclosed ideas—and [were] not
to be freely given.” Id. at 9. The patent system’s underlying policy, as espoused by Jefferson, was
“that ‘the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent[]’ . . . must
outweigh the restrictive effect of the limited patent monopoly.” Id. at 10–11. In conformity with
this principal, the Court began formulating general conditions of patentability. See id. at 11.
119. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 338. This Note suggests that in the context of the legal
profession, the costs associated with patent protection over legal methods exceed the benefits to
society.
120. The way Congress has fashioned the Patent Act “encodes a social view of patenting that
is very optimistic. The statute does not consider any field to be one in which the costs of patenting
will exceed the benefits inherently.”  MOY, supra note 16, at § 5:5.
strategies provides the opportunity for monopolization where a patent
holder refuses to grant a license on any terms to another, choosing instead
to use the patent to lure and secure more clients.  Though it may be, as115
one author suggests, that the common understanding of patent monopoly
“confuses an exclusive right with an economic monopoly,”  courts have116
expressed concern with patent rights used for anticompetitive purposes.117
Justice Brennan’s dissent in Chakrabarty explains, “The patent laws
attempt to reconcile this Nation’s deep seated antipathy to monopolies
with the need to encourage progress.”  118
However one construes a patent right, one thing remains clear: while
monopolies remain generally disfavored, “the Constitution takes the view
that the benefits of a patent system outweigh its costs.”  The question119
becomes, however, whether this observation remains true for all
professions.  Indiscriminately providing patent protection for all120
professions without forethought into the potential effects could prove
detrimental and costly for society. 
B.  Taking the Good with the Bad
Some fears may be laid to rest as patent laws only provide the right to
control new, useful, and nonobvious innovations, and therefore preclude
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121. MUELLER, supra note 1, at 21.
122. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1982); see supra notes 87–91 and accompanying
text. 
123. See generally MOY, supra note 16, at § 5:4 (suggesting that the current patent system
encourages innovation). 
124. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 348–49. 
125. Id. at 349; see Norris, supra note 8 (suggesting “[t]ax patents . . . amount to ‘government-
issued barbed wire’ to keep some taxpayers from getting equal treatment under the tax code”).
the ability to extract from the public existing innovations.  Because of121
this limit, established legal methods will continue to be used free from fear
of infringement. However, new methods or combinations of old strategies
give rise to legitimate concern in the legal profession. Lawyers are
constantly constructing, revising, and merging arguments. The ability to
do so enables a lawyer to adapt legal strategies to address a client’s issue
with greater precision in hopes of attaining a favorable outcome. For these
reasons, a legal method patent is a good thing. “[B]ecause a new
combination of steps in a process may be patentable even though all the
constituents of the combination were well known and in common use
before the combination was made,”  there is no telling how far a lawyer’s122
creativity can go. If our system recognizes that legal methods merit
protection, it does so based on the assumption that inventors will pursue
patentable innovations with greater vigor, and society will benefit from
progress.  But this textbook rhetoric provides no guarantees. And123
because lawyers bear responsibilities unlike many other professions, we
must be mindful of such hasty generalizations. 
C.  The Net Effect on Society
The unavailability of favorable legal methods to the public poses
another concern with patenting legal methods. Regarding tax strategies,
one author notes that the prominent view within the tax bar is that tax ideas
and methods should generally be available to all taxpayers.  “Many long124
time practitioners despair that if patents are permitted for tax strategies,
‘tax practitioners may be discouraged from freely discussing tax issues
with one another,’ thus reducing the beneficial exchange of ideas that
characterizes current tax practice.”  In a similar fashion, legal strategies125
and methods should be available to all societal members. If our legal
system is truly rooted in the notion of a common good, it seems illogical
to strip away from the public the underlying legal mechanisms that help
propel this nation forward. 
Perhaps with regard to legal strategy patents, Brennan’s dissent
resonates soundly when he warned, 
[g]iven the complexity and legislative nature of this delicate
20
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126. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 319 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
127. MUELLER, supra note 1, at 22.
128. Id. at 22–24.
129. Id. at 24. 
130. Id. at 24–25.
131. See supra note 56 and accompanying text; see also Irwin, supra note 6, at 779
(suggesting the patent system exists to create incentives “to maximize invention”).
132. MUELLER, supra note 1, at 24–25.
133. Seidenberg, supra note 3, at 47 (alteration in original) (quoting a staff report to the House
Ways and Means Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures). 
task, we must be careful to extend patent protection no further
than Congress has provided. In particular, were there an
absence of legislative direction, the courts should leave to
Congress the decisions whether and how far to extend the
patent privilege . . . .  126
D.  General Costs and Benefits in Our Patent System
With the decision to enforce patent rights come societal costs and
benefits.  Aside from considerable administrative costs, overlapping127
research and development expenditures in the same field by different
firms, and foregone research and development patent rights also have a
discernible effect on competition.  In spite of these costs, our patent128
system yields important benefits for the public,  including technological129
progress and economic activity that results from the manufacture and sale
of patented items—which generate jobs and further investment.  The130
underlying rationale for our patent system lies in providing members of
society ongoing incentive to propel innovation.  Publication of patent131
applications discloses information to the public; members of society are
given the opportunity to study the information; and, some even take it
upon themselves to build on this information and develop better
alternatives.  As a result, the patent system fosters evolutionary132
improvement, which is considered socially beneficial. Yet, consider:
‘In the context of tax strategy patents, however, some may
argue that innovation is . . . not socially beneficial . . . and
thus a fundamental premise behind a patent system is
missing. Specifically, many would argue that no social gains
from novel tax planning strategies exist as any gain to the
user of the strategy is offset by losses to the Treasury, and
therefore the resources devoted to producing and using such
strategies represent a net loss to society.’  133
Whether other legal method patents also represent a net loss to society has
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134. Tax lawyers in particular do not need incentive for innovation as they have been creative
for years without patent incentives. Id.
135. Id. 
136. MUELLER, supra note 1, at 22–25.
137. Spiegel v. Thomas, Mann & Smith, P.C., 811 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tenn. 1991) (citing ABA
Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 300 (1961)). 
138. To be sure, Congress has introduced bills aiming to reform patent law. See e.g., Patent
Reform Act of 2007, S. 1445, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/
D?c110:1:./temp/~c110SskWps::; see also Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong.
§ 10 (2007), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/~c110Fxzej0:e0:
(proposing to render any tax planning method unpatentable). In 2007, Senators Carl Levin, Norm
Coleman, and Barack Obama introduced the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, which aims to “stop tax
shelter patents by prohibiting the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office from issuing patents for
‘inventions[] designed to minimize, avoid, defer, or otherwise affect liability for Federal, State,
local, or foreign tax.’” Press Release, Carl Levin, Chairman, Senate Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations, Levin, Coleman, Obama Introduce Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act (Feb. 17, 2007),
available at http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/ release.cfm?id=269479 (citing Stop Tax Haven
yet to be determined. But at the very least, the legal profession should
examine the issue. 
Overall, it is unlikely the classical rationale underlying our patent
system serves the legal industry well. Providing incentives for innovation
may make sense in industries where innovation is rare, but the endless
creativity of lawyers in general, and tax lawyers in particular, makes this
rationale less applicable to the legal profession.  Moreover, like tax134
strategies, patents over legal methods compromise public confidence in the
legal system, jeopardize clients’ best interests, and hamper a lawyer’s
professional obligations to the legal profession and to their clients.  135
While society has grappled with—and in general accepted—the costs
and benefits of our patent system,  it remains uncertain whether the legal136
profession will find that the benefits of patenting legal methods outweigh
the costs. In the sections that follow, this Note will explore the social costs
to the legal profession, as well as examine the repercussions  to society,
should the judiciary and Congress permit the extention of patent protection
to legal strategies. 
IV.  SHOULD PATENT PROTECTION EXTEND TO LEGAL STRATEGIES?
For a variety of reasons, courts and the USPTO should exercise caution
against extending patent protection over legal strategies. As the ABA
Ethics Committee explained in 1961, “the practice of law is a profession,
not a business, [and] clients are not merchandise . . . .”  In light of a137
lawyer’s professional obligations, courts and the USPTO alike should be
sensitive to the restrictions patent rights exert on the legal profession.
Where courts and the USPTO fail to show this sensitivity, Congress should
provide legislative direction.138
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Abuse Act, S. 681, 110th Cong. § 303(g) (2007)). However, these bills have not been enacted into
laws. As a result, patent protection remains, in large part, in the hands of patent examiners.
139. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 10 (2002).
140. Id. at pmbl. ¶ 11.
141. Id. at pmbl. ¶ 10.
142. Id.
143. Id. at pmbl. ¶ 12.
144. Id. at pmbl. ¶ 13.
145. Id. at pmbl. ¶ 12.
146. Id. at pmbl. ¶ 1.
147. Id. at pmbl. ¶ 4–6, 8, 9.
148. This holds true primarily in part because the legal community deems loyalty and a
lawyer’s independent judgment as essential to the lawyer’s relationship to the client. See, e.g., id.
at R. 1.7 cmt. 1 (2002). Indeed, these characteristics lie at the center of many disciplinary rules, and
not surprisingly, most clients expect a lawyer to possess these characteristics. Where a lawyer
frustrates these expectations, lawyer-client relations may become strained. The disciplinary rules
aim to preserve optimal lawyer-client relations and are fashioned with these expectations in mind.
Accordingly, only under a narrow set of circumstances may a lawyer represent a client where a
conflict of interest exists. Id. Model Rule 1.7(a) states:
 A.  What Distinguishes the Legal Profession from All
Other Professions
Generally speaking, the legal profession is self-governing.  Self-139
regulation not only obviates the need for government regulation, but also
preserves the profession’s independence from government domination and
promotes the rule of government under law (since lawyers who do not
depend on government for the right to practice law are more likely to
challenge the abuse of legal authority).  Unlike other professions, the140
legal profession shares a unique connection with government.  “This141
connection is manifested in the fact that ultimate authority over the legal
profession is vested largely in the courts.”   142
With this relative autonomy, self-government requires lawyers to
exercise special responsibilities.  Lawyers play crucial roles in the143
preservation of government and society.  Among these responsibilities144
is providing reasonable assurance that the profession’s regulations are
rooted in public interest, rather than self-interest.  It is in this light that145
drafters fashioned the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.146
One might argue that the disciplinary rules that govern lawyers speak
only to the relationship between the lawyer and the client, so that lawyer’s
obligations are individual in scope. To be sure, the ethical principles that
guide lawyers require zealous advocacy in pursuit of a client’s legitimate
interests.  To this end, devising a legal method for a client fulfills this147
ethical obligation. If disciplinary rules are construed narrowly, a lawyer
need not look beyond the representation of a client, and instead, must work
only to serve the client’s objective.  But examining the collective aim of148
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[A] lawyer shall not represent a client if . . . 
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or 
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be
materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client
or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.
Id. at R. 1.7(a)(1)–(2).
149. Id. at pmbl. ¶¶ 5, 7, 8.
150. Id. at pmbl. ¶ 6.
151. Id. at pmbl. ¶ 2.
152. American Legal Ethics Library: Topical Overview—Index of Narratives,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/comparative/index.htm#2.1:100. Cornell Law School maintains
the site, and one may access links to ethics resources from every state and some narratives
concerning legal ethics rules in many states. American Legal Ethics Library: Comments & Context,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics.
the legal profession reveals a different purpose. A lawyer’s obligations
extend beyond the relationship between lawyer and client on an individual
basis.
As officers of the legal system, lawyers owe additional responsibility
to the legal system in general.  The Preamble to the Model Rules states:149
As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the
law, access to the legal system, the administration of justice
and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession. As
a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivate
knowledge of  the law beyond its use for clients . . . . [A]ll
lawyers should devote professional time and resources and
use civic influence to ensure equal access to our system of
justice for all those who because of economic or social
barriers cannot afford or secure adequate legal counsel.150
When disciplinary rules governing the legal profession are viewed with
this broader purpose in mind, it becomes clear that the profession should
reconcile conflicting responsibilities to clients and the legal system in a
manner that does not compromise the public interest.
B.  Competence
Defining the role of a lawyer can become problematic, for as a client’s
representative, a lawyer performs an array of critical functions. The
preamble to the Model Rules best encapsulates the roles a lawyer must
undertake to serve the client. Chief among these responsibilities is the
lawyer’s role as advisor. In this regard, “a lawyer provides a client with an
informed understanding of the client’s legal rights and obligations and
explains their practical implications.”  States across the country151
recognize the significance of this core role.  A lawyer must also provide152
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153. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002).
154. Id.
155. See generally Schwartz, supra note 3 (warning that patenting legal methods will require
lawyers to take extra precautionary measures before giving their clients legal advice); Seidenberg,
supra note 3 (same). 
156. Seidenberg supra note 3, at 42, 45; see Schwartz, supra note 3. See generally Hearing,
supra note 37, at 11. In 2006, the chairman of an American Bar Association task force expressed
disapproval and stated, “I can’t even imagine what it will be like in 5 or 10 years . . . if anytime a
lawyer or accountant gives tax advice, they have to find out if there is a patent on this.” Norris,
supra note 8. The chairman noted further “that researching patents, and then licensing them, would
just [sic] make tax compliance more costly.” Id. By comparison, lawyers would encounter the same
difficulties with respect to legal method patents.
157. Seidenberg, supra note 3, at 45.
158. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 2 (2002).
159. “Finding legal strategy patents that apply to a given area of practice is only half the
battle.” Seidenberg, supra note 3, at 45.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 45–46.
162. Id. at 46.
163. See Hearing, supra note 37, at 55.
164. Commenting on the idea that estate-planning strategies might be subject to patents,
Chicago attorney Christine Albright said: “We will have to become knowledgeable about patents
issued in our area of the law, which will mean keeping an eye on patents that are published and
a client with competent representation.  The Model Rules define153
competence as requiring “the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”  If patents154
protected legal strategies, the rule on competence would require a lawyer
to employ a number of precautionary measures before even sitting down
to offer legal solutions to a matter.155
Patent laws would require the lawyer to first verify whether a patent for
the desired legal strategy has been issued.  Assuming the USPTO has156
granted such a patent, the lawyer must then decipher precisely the patent’s
“scope.”  To comport with the Model Rule on competence, the lawyer157
would essentially be obligated to study  the patent to ensure that the legal158
advice the lawyer wishes to render has not been compromised. This step
in and of itself, is of no consequence; after all, all lawyers are obligated to
continually study the law. Yet, in this instance, it seems excessive to
require a lawyer to become an expert in patent law simply to render legal
advice.  159
Patent claims must be interpreted in light of the patent’s prosecution
and any court rulings made about the patent.  “That calls for a review of160
a patent’s prosecution history—essentially, statements and amendments
made during the approval process—to really understand what it covers.”161
However, reviewing prosecution history can prove daunting.  Patents162
with multiple patent claims complicate the analysis.  Providing good163
legal services therefore requires mastering the art of patent law.  So, apart164
25
Varela: Damned If You Do, Doomed If You Don't: Patenting Legal Methods an
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2008
1170 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60
granted in our industry.” Gunnarsson, supra note 12, at 344.
165. Seidenberg, supra note 3, at 46.
166. 35 U.S.C. § 273(b) (2006); see Seidenberg, supra note 3, at 46 (stating the reason for the
legislation was due to the rise in business method patents the USPTO initially received). Schwartz
explains, “[a] defendant accused of infringing a business method patent has a complete defense if
it had actually been using the method before the patentee filed her patent application.” Schwartz,
supra note 1, at 345–46. “The defense provides that a business method patent may not be enforced
against anyone who independently reduced the patented method to practice at least one year before
the effective filing date of the patent and who commercially used the patented method before the
effective filing date.” Seidenberg, supra note 3, at 46. Whether this defense applies here remains
uncertain. Id.
167. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text. 
168. If this does not sufficiently deter future practitioners from law practice, consider repeating
these preliminary tasks each time a client approaches the lawyer with a new problem. Christine
Albright, a Chicago attorney who chairs both the trust and estates practice group of Winston &
Strawn in Chicago and the American Bar Association’s Section of Real Property, Probate, and
Trust Law, “foresees that a market may arise to notify lawyers and law firms of patents issued in
their [law] practice area.” Gunnarsson, supra note 12, at 344.
169. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002).
170. Id. at cmt. 2.
from keeping abreast of issues in a lawyer’s practice area, a lawyer must
subscribe to more than just “Patent 101” basics to gain a competitive edge.
In the alternative, the lawyer may simply defer the client to another
attorney, perhaps one who does not mind unraveling the perplexities that
keep most lawyers away from patent infringement allegations.
Moreover, lawyers must remain on guard, for once the USPTO issues
a legal strategy patent, a method may unexpectedly infringe upon patent
rights unless it was established before the patent application was filed.165
An infringer might receive protection from the “first inventor” defense166
that Congress provided in 1999 in response to the flood of business
method patents the USPTO received following State Street.  If narrowly167
construed, however, so as to preclude lawyers and clients from resorting
to such a defense, the ever mindful lawyer might need to assume a more
aggressive “watchdog” role; this role would entail continually verifying
that the lawyer’s strategies do not call for substantial modifications to
prevent infringing upon some new patent.  168
Such measures require skill, a required component of competence.169
In the comment that follows the Model Rule on competence, the ABA
drafters wrote: “the most fundamental legal skill consists of determining
what kind of legal problems a situation may involve . . . .”  In this regard,170
a lawyer cannot afford to remain aloof of evolving patent rights issued for
legal strategies; otherwise, the lawyer and client alike remain susceptible
to infringement suits. Lawyers routinely determine the kinds of legal
problems a situation may involve; but throw in some patented advice and
things become unduly complicated. This is not to suggest a general
26
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171. 54A AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 942 (2008) (footnote omitted).
172. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6 (2002). The rule reads:
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making: (a) a partnership,
shareholders, operating, employment, or other similar type of agreement that
restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship,
except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement; or
(b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice is part of
the settlement of a client controversy.
Id. While the model rule aptly addresses anti-competitive provisions in a lawyer’s employment
contract, there is no suggestion that it would bar a broader construction on the rule, particularly in
light of underlying rationale that fashioned the rule, as expressed in the comments that follow. See
id. at cmt. 1.
173. Id. 
174. “An agreement restricting the right of lawyers to practice after leaving a firm not only
limits their professional autonomy but also limits the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer.” Id.
Noting law firms are unable to protect themselves from future competition of former employees
by including reasonable anti-competitive provisions in an attorney’s employment contract, John
Levin, a member of the Chicago Bar Association Record Editorial Board, observed “Rule 5.6
protects both a lawyer’s autonomy to practice law and a client’s right to choose the lawyer of
choice.” John Levin, Protecting Your Business: What You Can and Cannot Do, CBA RECORD, Apr.
2008, at 53, 53.
175. Levin, supra note 174, at 59.
176. Spiegel v. Thomas, Mann & Smith, P.C., 811 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tenn. 1991) (quoting
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2 (1980)).
practitioner cannot overcome these complexities, but patent attorneys do
require a license to practice patent law for a reason. The additional daily
tasks many lawyers would be required to undertake to provide competent
representation may prove overwhelming.
C.  Restrictions on Right to Practice
A central tenet of the legal profession is the preservation of a client’s
choice of counsel. Primarily for this purpose, “[t]he ethics rule clearly
forbids outright prohibitions on an attorney’s practice of law, and in most
states, this prohibition extends to indirect restrictions on the practice of
law, such as financial disincentives to competition.”  Indeed, the ABA’s171
Model Rule entitled “Restrictions on Right to Practice”  suggests an172
ethical intolerance for improper restraints on a lawyer’s right to practice.173
The comment accompanying this model rule  “reflects the obligation of174
our legal institutions to give the client the right to choose his or her own
counsel.”  Lawyers therefore share a professional obligation to “assist the175
legal profession in fulfilling its duty to make legal counsel available” to
the public.  Agreements that frustrate this professional obligation and176
interfere with the availability of counsel are void as against public
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177. Id.
178. Id. at 529. 
179. See generally Neil W. Hamilton, Are We a Profession or Merely a Business? The Erosion
of Rule 5.6 and the Bar Against Restrictions on the Right to Practice, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1409, 1430–31 (1996) (suggesting that although a conflict exists between the lawyer’s right to
practice and the client’s choice of counsel, the right of the client to select the counsel of his choice
should ultimately prevail). 
180. Id. at 1413.
181. Id.
182. See Seidenberg, supra note 3, at 45. The average lawyer must keep abreast of what ideas
are being patented. Id. Recommending a particular course of action may render a lawyer, a firm
and/or a client liable for patent infringement. Id. Some suggest looking at the patent office
classification website daily for issued patents. Id. 
183. Some attorneys would forego mention of a legal idea if patented “because that takes
control of the planning process out of [our] hands and makes it dependent on a third party.” Id. at
46. 
184. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 179, at 1431.
policy.  As one court held, even “thinly-disguised” arrangements, which177
in effect restrict the practice of law and infringe on the availability of
counsel, are void against public policy.  178
1.  Interference with a Client’s Counsel of Choice
The legal impediments that accompany the patenting of legal strategies
may not only infringe on a lawyer’s professional duty, but may also
interfere with a client’s freedom to select counsel of her choice—an
overarching objective of our justice system.  The history of the model179
rule governing restrictions on a lawyer’s right to practice demonstrates that
its objective is to ensure the client’s freedom to select counsel of her
choice.  “The rule is intended to serve the public interest by ensuring a180
client’s maximum choice among lawyers . . . . [T]he focus of the rule is
that the affected clients have the right to decide for themselves which
lawyer they wish to handle their affairs without interference . . . .”181
Imposing on a lawyer a third-party obligation to a patent holder
undermines this fundamental societal objective.
By requiring lawyers to master patent law  in addition to mastering182
the law in their practice area, some attorneys will forego disclosing a
patented legal idea to their clients.  This may deter otherwise qualified183
lawyers from providing counsel where legal strategies must comport with
a patent, thereby limiting a client’s freedom to counsel of choice. Critics
may counter this argument, by pointing to other professional relationships,
such as a doctor-patient relationship, where patents do not necessarily
deter practitioners from providing professional services.  However, 184
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185. Id. at 1430–31.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 179–81.
187. ABA CANONS ON PROF’L ETHICS Canon 35 (1923).
188. Id.
189. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2002) (outlining the legislative history of Model
Rule 5.4).
190. ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 35 (1923).
[t]he legal profession has its own standards, differing from
those of other professions, deriving from the profession’s role
in the justice system . . . . [F]or the [justice] system to
work, . . . [t]he client must have free choice of counsel who
enjoys the client’s maximum trust and confidence. Our
society’s goal that our adversary system results in our best
approximation of justice depends upon the trust in the lawyer
client relationship.185
The stakes are not only different in the legal profession—they are higher
and more complex. Perhaps because of the nature of the lawyer-client
relationship, some lawyers would be less willing to provide legal counsel
where control, to a large extent, would lie in the hands of some third
party.186
In a similar fashion, if the patent holder inhibits other lawyers from
providing clients with the most effective legal services, then the patent
holder implicitly narrows the pool of competent lawyers. Yet, an
intermediary’s ability to interfere with the practice of law is precisely the
situation that the ethics rules are designed to avert.  Indeed, this result187
directly contravenes the ethical ideology many ABA drafters espoused
when drafting rules on professional conduct.  The ABA’s drafting history188
on the ethics of professional lawyering reveals the drafters’ disdain for
legal services controlled by intermediaries.  The ABA Canons of189
Professional Ethics stated: 
The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled
or exploited by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which
intervenes between client and lawyer. A lawyer’s
responsibilities and qualifications are individual. He should
avoid all relations which direct the performance of his duties
by or in the interest of such intermediary. A lawyer’s relation
to his client should be personal, and the responsibility should
be direct to the client.190
Yet adherence to this view proves difficult, if not impossible, in light of
the third-party obligations owed to patent holders. Where a patent over a
legal strategy has been issued, the patent holder owns the right to issue or
refuse a license at her discretion. Consequently, the patent serves as a
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191. Id.
192. FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-1.7(b) (2008), available at
http://www.floridabar.org/divexe/rrtfb.nsf/FV/2E30A65D3638C6B485257171004B3C67.
Exceptions to this rule include: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not
adversely affect the lawyer’s responsibilities to and relationship with the other client; and (2) each
client consents after consultation. Id. Cf. N.Y. LAW.’S CODE OF PROF’L RESP. EC 5-21 (2008),
available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/search/display.html?terms=EC%205-
21&url=/ethics/ny/code/NY_CODE.HTM#EC_5-21. The full text of the ethical considerations to
the New York rule reads: 
The obligation of a lawyer to exercise professional judgment solely on behalf
of the client requires disregarding the desires of others that might impair the
lawyer’s free judgment. The desires of a third person will seldom adversely affect
a lawyer unless that person is in a position to exert strong economic, political, or
social pressures upon the lawyer. These influences are often subtle, and a lawyer
must be alert to their existence. A lawyer subjected to outside pressures should
make full disclosure of them to the client; and if the lawyer or the client believes
that the effectiveness of the representation has been or will be impaired thereby,
the lawyer should take proper steps to withdraw from representation of the client.
Id. 
193. Seidenberg, supra note 3, at 46. “Once a relevant patent is found and its scope
determined, lawyers and their clients have to decide whether to challenge the patent, seek a license,
or ignore the patent and hope they don’t get caught.” Id. 
controlling mechanism manipulated at the whim of some remote third
party. With regard to a particular patented legal theory the lawyer and
client both wish to pursue, the scope of a lawyer’s professional services
essentially lie in the hands of another. Thus, the effects of granting patents
for legal strategies are twofold: (1) patent protection would deter lawyers
from taking on cases encumbered with patent restrictions, and (2) patent
protection would strip away a lawyer’s professional autonomy, as such a
legal obligation would subject the lawyer to answer not only to the client,
but to some other third party.
2.  Interference with Independent Professional Judgment
Patenting legal strategies also has the effect of materially interfering
with the lawyer’s exercise of independent professional judgment in
considering alternatives, and potentially foreclosing courses of action that
should reasonably be pursued.  Florida’s Rules of Professional Conduct,191
for instance, prohibit a lawyer from representing a client “if the lawyer’s
exercise of independent professional judgment in the representation of that
client may be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to . . . a
third person or by the lawyer’s own interest . . . .”  To pursue a patented192
legal course of action, the lawyer must first secure a license from the
patent holder.  If the patent holder refuses to grant this license, or will do193
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194. Id. at 44.
195. Seidenberg, supra note 3, at 46. Cf. Norris, supra note 8 (suggesting a patent holder can
raise the cost of conducting business by refusing to issue licenses to competitors). 
196. Seidenberg, supra note 3, at 46 (quoting Christine Albright, chair of the ABA Section of
Real Property, Probate and Trust Law); see also Schwartz, supra note 3 (“There is something
deeply disturbing about granting a private citizen a monopoly, enforceable by the courts, over a
method of complying with the tax code or, for that matter, any other law.”).
197. Tracht, supra note 7, at 5.
198. Seidenberg, supra note 3, at 46.
199. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2002).
200. Id. 
201. Id.; see also RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS: THE
LAWYER’S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 645 (2006–2007 ed. 2006).
so only in exchange for some unreasonable fee, the responsibilities owed
to the patent holder inhibits the lawyer’s exercise of independent
professional judgment. Lawyers will be legally impaired from pursuing a
legal theory that could render the most favorable outcome for the client.
As a result, legal strategy patents essentially barricade the lawyer’s
exercise of independent professional judgment. 
A related concern is the extent to which a patent restricts how others
can employ a method or process for personal use.  Suppose a patent194
holder decides to hold out on issuing a license, places insurmountable
conditions on issuance, demands an exorbitant sum of money, or refuses
to grant a license no matter the terms, preferring instead to use the patent
as leverage for attaining more clients.  Imagine a scenario either where195
the lawyer has exhausted other alternatives to no avail or where the only
viable option for the client lies within the scope of this patent. “Even if the
patent owner is willing to negotiate a license on reasonable terms, the
process ‘will create some friction in terms of expense, timing and
availability of concepts.’”  196
By foreclosing alternatives that otherwise would be available to the
client, legal strategy patents potentially leave the client dissatisfied with
the outcome of a case or discouraged in seeking advice in the future.
Ultimately, the foreclosure of legal alternatives can hamper the structure
of creative deals  and interfere with the nation’s economy. Furthermore,197
the steps required for obtaining a license raises the possibility of disclosing
confidential client information.  Overall, patent protection could frustrate198
public confidence in the legal system. 
Additionally, legal strategy patents may inhibit a lawyer from
rendering full, frank, and candid advice to a client, as required by the rules
of professional conduct.  In giving legal advice, a lawyer is not limited199
to discussing legal considerations with the client.  Rather, the lawyer200
may refer to other considerations, including moral, economic, social, and
political factors.  Ideally then, the lawyer will propose a number of legal201
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202. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 201, at 648 (footnotes omitted).
203. See Seidenberg, supra note 3, at 46.
204. What’s more, what client wants to pay an attorney extra to cover the cost of licensing
fees? Schwartz, supra note 3.
options (including patented strategies) for a client to pursue and discuss
the advantages and disadvantages of each. With regard to a patented
strategy, the lawyer may express reservation to the client, explaining the
complexities—including the expense—that accompany the use of the
patented legal method. Certainly, 
[t]he lawyer who couches her advice too narrowly is a lawyer
who ill-serves her client. Of course, the client, not the lawyer,
ultimately must make the final decision whether to accept the
lawyer’s judgment based on nonlegal considerations. But the
client cannot make this judgment to ignore the lawyer’s
nonlegal considerations if the lawyer never tells the client.202
Indeed, the obstacles a lawyer encounters before even proposing a course
of legal action may preclude some lawyers from ever mentioning the
patented legal idea.  Some legal professionals may find rendering such203
advice cumbersome, and may arguably justify failure to even share
patented legal options with clients with the notion that lawyers are under
no obligation to expose all legal courses of action readily available to a
client. Where the lawyer weighs client interests, legal options, and
professional costs in these scenarios, the lawyer may be left wondering,
“damned if you do, doomed if you don’t.”
V.  WHO BEARS THE ULTIMATE COSTS?
With all the additional tasks a lawyer would necessarily undertake if
legal strategies are patented, the question becomes: Who bears the ultimate
costs? It is unlikely lawyers will assume the brunt of patent-related
expenses. After all, in exerting an extra effort to serve client interests, the
lawyer rightfully expects a fee commensurate with those efforts. But
unless lawyers absorb some of the financial costs for these measures,
clients will be less willing to seek legal advice in the first place. Most
clients lack the financial stamina to afford higher fees.
From a client’s perspective, substantial familiarity with patent law and
awareness of emerging legal patents would become part and parcel of any
lawyer’s general job description. If lawyers across the board are expected
to execute additional measures to avoid patent infringement, well then, that
is their job, is it not? Clients should not incur larger fees in exchange for
what they expect from their lawyer—the best legal advice.  On the other204
hand, if a client chooses to pursue a patented legal method in spite of
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205. Under Model Rule 1.4, a lawyer must “reasonably consult with the client about the means
by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
1.4(a)(2) (2002). Under Model Rule 1.5, “[t]he scope of the representation and the basis or rate of
the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client.”
Id. at R. 1.5(b).
whatever caveats a lawyer presents, then the client should absorb these
costs.  Varying circumstances will likely call for clients and firms alike205
to share these costs. The extent to which firms project such expenditures
unto clients will surely be an issue courts will consider in awarding
attorney fees in the not so distant future.
VI.  CONCLUSION
Following the Federal Circuit’s decision in State Street to extend patent
protection over business methods, the USPTO has opened a Pandora’s box
by endorsing the patentability of tax strategies. Patent protection over
other legal methods will likely continue given the USPTO’s interpretation
of the Patent Act and its understanding of the State Street doctrine. 
Deeply embedded in our patent system is the optimistic view that
patents spur innovation and benefit society as a whole. While this may
hold true for the legal profession, there is some question as to whether
patenting legal methods overrides important societal interests, especially
in light of a lawyer’s professional responsibilities. The possibility remains
that costs will exceed the benefits. Placing endless caveats, foreclosing
promising alternatives, raising costs for adequate representation, and
potentially even closing the door on surefire legal strategies all effectively
serve as deterrents in seeking professional advice. Moreover, the legal
profession will likely suffer a substantial decline in public confidence as
legal patents pose new barriers to effective counsel, including limits on
professional autonomy, limits on a client’s freedom of counsel of choice,
and limits on independence of professional judgments. These barriers not
only contravene sound public policy but also preclude lawyers from
fulfilling their professional obligations to clients and to the profession. 
Where the USPTO exceeds its authority and courts prove slow to
respond, prompt legislative reform seems well-advised.
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